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Abstract
In monetary models where agents are subject to trading shocks
there is typically an ex-post inefficiency since some agents are hold-
ing idle balances while others are cash constrained. This problem
creates a role for financial intermediaries, such as banks, who ac-
cept nominal deposits and make nominal loans. In general, finan-
cial intermediation improves the allocation. The gains in welfare
come from the payment of interest on deposits and not from re-
laxing borrowers’ liquidity constraints. We also demonstrate that
when credit rationing occurs increasing the rate of inflation can be
welfare improving. JEL Codes E41, E50
Keywords : Money, Credit, Rationing, Banking.
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1 Introduction
In monetary models where agents are subject to trading shocks there is typi-
cally an ex-post inefficiency since some agents are holding idle balances while
others are cash constrained.1 Given this inefficiency a credit market that real-
locates money across agents would reduce or eliminate this inefficiency. While
this seems obvious at first glance, it overlooks a fundamental tension between
money and credit. A standard result in monetary theory is that for money
to be essential in exchange there must be an absence of record keeping. In
contrast, credit requires record keeping. This tension has made it inherently
difficult to introduce credit into a model where money is essential.2 Further-
more, once credit exists the issues of repayment and enforcement naturally
arise.
In this paper we address the following questions. First, how can money
and credit coexist in an environment where money is essential? Second, can
financial intermediation improve the allocation? Third, what is the optimal
monetary policy if all trades are voluntary, i.e. when there is no enforcement?
To answer these questions, we introduce financial intermediation into a
monetary model based on the Lagos and Wright [21] framework. We call fi-
nancial intermediaries ‘banks’ because they accept nominal deposits and make
nominal loans. Banks have a record-keeping technology that allows them to
keep track of financial histories but agents still trade with each other in anony-
mous goods markets. Hence, there is no record keeping of good market trades.
Consequently, the existence of financial record keeping does not eliminate the
need for money as a medium of exchange. We characterize the monetary equi-
libria in two cases: with and without enforcement. By enforcement we mean
that banks can force repayment at no cost, which prevents any default, and the
monetary authority can impose lump-sum taxes. In an environment with no
enforcement, the monetary authority cannot tax agents and the only penalty
for default is exclusion from the financial system.
With regard to the second question, we show that the equilibrium with
credit improves the allocation. The gain in welfare comes from payment of
interest to agents holding idle balances and not from relaxing borrowers’ liq-
uidity constraints. With respect to the third question, the answer depends on
1Models with this property include [5], [8], [9], [15], [23] and [26].
2By essential we mean that the use of money expands the set of allocations (see [19] and
[33]).
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whether enforcement is feasible or not. If enforcement is feasible, the Friedman
rule attains the first-best allocation. The intuition is that under the Friedman
rule agents can perfectly self-insure against consumption risk by holding money
at no cost. Consequently, there is no need for financial intermediation — the
allocation is the same with or without credit. In contrast, without enforce-
ment, deflation cannot be implemented nor can banks force agents to repay
loans. In this situation, we show that price stability is not the optimal policy
since some inflation can be welfare improving. The reason is that inflation
makes holding money more costly, which increases the punishment from being
excluded from the financial system and thus the incentives to repay loans.3
How does our approach differ from the existing literature? Other mecha-
nisms have been proposed to address the inefficiencies that arise when some
agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained. These
mechanisms involve either trading cash against some other illiquid asset [20],
collateralized trade credit [29] or inside money [10, 11, 12, 16].
In our model, the role of credit is similar to that of ‘illiquid’ bonds in
Kocherlakota [20] — credit allows the transfer of money from those with a
low marginal value of consumption to those with a high valuation. The key
difference is that in [20] agents adjust their portfolios by trading assets while
in our model agents acquire one asset, namely money, by issuing liabilities.
Although both approaches have the same implications for the allocation, in
general, the presence of illiquid bonds does not eliminate the role of credit.
The reason is that some agents may hold so little money and bonds that they
would like to borrow additional money to acquire goods. Finally, Kocherlakota
never explains why bonds are illiquid. This is not a problem for us because
in our environment the interest-bearing debt instruments are held by agents
who do not want to consume.
The mechanisms of [29] and [10, 11] are related to ours since some buyers
are able to relax their cash constraint by issuing personal liabilities directly to
sellers and this improves the allocation. However, the inefficiency associated
with holding idle cash balances is not eliminated. In our model agents can
either borrow to relax their cash constraints or lend their idle cash balances
and earn interest. More importantly, contrary to these other models, we find
that the welfare gain associated with financial intermediation is not due to
relaxing buyers’ cash constraints. Instead it comes from generating a positive
3This confirms the intuition in Aiyagari and Williamson [1] for why the optimal inflation
rate is positive when enforcement is not feasible.
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rate of return on idle cash balances.4
Another key difference between our analysis and the existing literature is
that, with divisible money, we can study how changes in the growth rate of
the money supply affect the allocation.5 Also, in terms of pricing, we use
competitive pricing rather than bargaining (although we do study bargaining
for comparison purposes).6 Furthermore, unlike [10, 11] and related models
we do not have bank claims circulating as medium of exchange nor do we have
goods market trading histories observable for any agent. Finally, in contrast
to [16], there is no security motive for depositing cash in the bank.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the environment and
Section 3 the agents’ decision problems. In Section 4 we derive the equilibrium
when banks can force repayment at no cost and in Section 5 when punishment
for a defaulter is permanent exclusion from the banking system. The last
section concludes.
2 The Environment
The basic framework we use is the divisible money model developed in Lagos
and Wright [21]. This model is useful because it allows us to introduce het-
erogenous preferences for consumption and production while still keeping the
distribution of money balances analytically tractable.7 Time is discrete and
in each period there are two perfectly competitive markets that open sequen-
tially. There is a [0, 1] continuum of infinitely-lived agents and one perishable
good produced and consumed by all agents.
At the beginning of the first market agents get a preference shock such
that they can either consume or produce. With probability 1 − n an agent
can consume but cannot produce while with probability n the agent can pro-
duce but cannot consume. We refer to consumers as buyers and producers as
4This shows that being constrained is not per se a source of inefficiency. In any general
equilibrium model all agents face a budget constraint. Nevertheless, the equilibrium is
efficient because all gains from trade are exploited.
5Recently, [13] has also developed a model of banking in which money and goods are
divisible. His banks serve a very different purpose than modeled here and they have records
of goods markets trades between individuals, hence it is doubtful that money is essential in
his model.
6Competitive pricing in the Lagos-Wright framework has been introduced by [27] and
further investigated in [3], [6] and [22].
7An alternative framework would be [30] which we could amend with preference and
technology shocks to generate the same results.
5
sellers. Agents get utility u(q) from q consumption in the first market, where
u0(q) > 0, u00(q) < 0, u0(0) = +∞, and u0(∞) = 0. Furthermore, we assume
the elasticity of utility e (q) = qu
0(q)
u(q) is bounded. Producers incur utility cost
c (q) from producing q units of output with c0 (q) > 0, c00 (q) ≥ 0. To moti-
vate a role for fiat money, we assume that all goods trades are anonymous so
agents cannot identify their trading partners. Consequently, trading histories
of agents are private information and sellers require immediate compensation
meaning buyers must pay with money.8
In the second market all agents consume and produce, getting utility U(x)
from x consumption, with U 0(x) > 0, U 0(0) =∞, U 0(+∞) = 0 and U 00(x) ≤ 0.
The difference in preferences over the good sold in the last market allows us
to impose technical conditions such that the distribution of money holdings is
degenerate at the beginning of a period. Agents can produce one unit of the
consumption good with one unit of labor which generates one unit of disutility.
The discount factor across dates is β ∈ (0, 1).
We assume a central bank exists that controls the supply of fiat currency.
The growth rate of the money stock is given by Mt = γMt−1 where γ > 0
and Mt denotes the per capita money stock in t. Agents receive lump-sum
transfers τMt−1 = (γ−1)Mt−1 over the period. Some of the transfer is received
at the beginning of market 1 and some during market 2. Let τ 1Mt−1 and
τ 2Mt−1 denote the transfers in market 1 and 2 respectively with τ 1 + τ 2 = τ .
Moreover, τ 1 = (1− n) τ b + nτ s since the government might wish to treat
buyers and sellers differently. This transfer scheme is merely an analytical
device to see whether or not a government policy of differential lump-sum
transfers based on an individual’s relative need for cash can replicate the same
allocation that occurs with banking. Note that although buyers and sellers
get different transfers they are lump sum in nature since they do not affect
marginal decisions. For notational ease variables corresponding to the next
period are indexed by +1, and variables corresponding to the previous period
are indexed by −1.
If there is enforcement, the central bank can levy nominal taxes to extract
cash from the economy, then τ < 0 and hence γ < 1. Implicitly this means
that the central bank can force agents to trade. However, this does not mean
that it can force agents to produce or consume certain quantities in the good
8There is no contradiction between assuming Walrasian markets and anonymity. To
calculate the market clearing price, a Walrasian auctioneer only needs to know the aggregate
excess demand function and not the identity of the individual traders.
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markets nor does it mean that it knows the identity of the agents. If the central
bank does not have this power, lump-sum taxes are not feasible so γ ≥ 1. We
will derive the equilibrium for both environments.
Banks and record keeping. We model credit as financial intermediation
done by perfectly competitive firms who accept nominal deposits and make
nominal loans. For this process to work we assume that there is a technology
that allows record keeping of financial histories but not trading histories in
the goods market. Firms that operate this record-keeping technology can do
so at zero cost. We call them banks because the financial intermediaries who
perform these activities - taking deposits, making loans, keeping track of credit
histories - are classified as ‘banks’ by regulators around the world. Since record
keeping can only be done for financial transactions, trade credit between buyers
and sellers is not feasible. Moreover, since there is no collateral in our model
bilateral trade credit cannot be supported as in [29]. Record keeping does not
imply that banks can issue tangible objects such as inside money. Hence, we
assume that there are no bank notes in circulation. This ensures that outside
fiat currency is still used as a medium of exchange in the goods market.9
Finally, we assume that loans and deposits are not rolled over. Consequently,
all financial contracts are one-period contracts. One-period debt contracts are
optimal in these environments because of the quasi-linear preferences. Unlike
standard dynamic contracting models, with linear disutility of production in
market 2, there is no gain from spreading out repayment of loans or redemption
of deposits across periods in order to smooth the disutility of production.10
9Alternatively, we could assume that our banks issue their own currencies but there is a
100 percent reserve requirement in place. In this case the financial system would be similar
to narrow banking [32].
10In a stationary equilibrium, the Lagos-Wright framework turns the economy into a
sequence of repeated static problems. Hence, a one-period contract is sufficient to deal with
any trading frictions occurring within the period.
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Figure 1. Cash and credit.
Although all goods transactions require money, buyers do not face a stan-
dard cash-in-advance constraint. Before trading, they can borrow cash from
the bank to supplement their money holdings but do so at the cost of the
nominal interest rate as illustrated in Figure 1, which describes the flow of
goods, credit and money in our model for markets 1 and 2. Note the absence
of links between the seller and the bank.11 The missing link is consistent with
the assumption that there is no record-keeping in the goods market due to
anonymity. For example, it rules out the following mechanism. At the end of
each period, every agent reports to the bank the identity of the trading part-
ners and the quantities traded. If the report of an agent does not match the
report of his trading partner, then the bank punishes both agents by excluding
them from the banking system. This mechanism requires that the agents in
the good market can accurately identify their trading partners, which violates
our assumption of anonymity.12
Default. In any model of credit, default is a serious issue. We first assume
that banks can force repayment at no cost. In such an environment, default
is not possible so agents face no borrowing constraints. In this case, banks
are nothing more than cash machines that post interest rates for deposits
and loans. In equilibrium these posted interest rates clear the market. We
11At the beginning of market 1 the seller deposits money at the bank which is redeemed
in market 2. These two transactions, however, are independent from the flow of money
between buyer and bank and buyer and seller as described in Figure 1.
12It also excludes commonly used forms of payments such as credit card or check pay-
ments. Such payments require that all agents must identify themselves and the value of their
goods transactions to the banking system. With this information, money is not essential
since all exchange can be done via record keeping.
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then consider an environment where banks cannot force agents to repay. The
only punishment available is that a borrower who fails to repay his loan is
excluded from the financial sector in all future periods. Given this punishment,
we derive conditions to ensure voluntary repayment and show that this may
involve binding borrowing constraints, i.e. credit rationing.
Welfare. At the beginning of a period before types are realized, the expected
steady state lifetime utility of the representative agent is
(1− β)W = (1− n)u (qb)− nc (qs) + U(x)− x (1)
where qb is consumption and qs production in market 2. We use (1) as our
welfare criteria.
To derive the welfare maximizing quantities we assume that all agents
are treated symmetrically. The planner then maximizes (1) subject to the
feasibility constraint
(1− n) qb = nqs. (2)
The first-best allocation satisfies
U 0 (x∗)= 1 and
u0 (q∗)= c0
µ
1− n
n
q∗
¶
. (3)
where q∗ ≡ q∗b = n(1−n)q∗s . These are the quantities chosen by a social planner
who could force agents to produce and consume.
3 Symmetric equilibrium
The timing in our model is as follows. At the beginning of the first market
agents observe their production and consumption shocks and they receive the
lump-sum transfers τ 1M−1. Then, the banking sector opens and agents can
borrow or deposit money. Finally, the banking sector closes and agents trade
goods. In the second market agents trade goods and settle financial claims.
In period t, let φ be the real price of money in the second market. We
focus on symmetric and stationary equilibria where all agents follow identical
strategies and where real allocations are constant over time. In a stationary
equilibrium end-of-period real money balances are time-invariant
φM = φ+1M+1. (4)
9
Moreover, we restrict our attention to equilibria where γ is time invariant
which implies that φ/φ+1 = P+1/P =M+1/M = γ.
13
Consider a stationary equilibrium. Let V (m) denote the expected value
from trading in market 1 with m money balances at time t. Let W (m, c, d)
denote the expected value from entering the second market with m units of
money, c loans, and d deposits at time t. In what follows, we look at a
representative period t and work backwards from the second to the first market.
3.1 The second market
In the second market agents produce h goods and consume x, repay loans,
redeem deposits and adjust their money balances. If an agent has borrowed c
units of money, then he pays (1 + i) c units of money, where i is the nominal
loan rate. If he has deposited d units of money, he receives (1 + id) d, where
id is the nominal deposit rate. The representative agent’s program is
W (m, c, d) = max
x,h,m+1
[U (x)− h+ βV+1 (m+1)] (5)
s.t. x+ φm+1 = h+ φ (m+ τ 2M−1) + φ (1 + id) d− φ (1 + i) c
where m+1 is the money taken into period t + 1 and φ is the real price of
money. Rewriting the budget constraint in terms of h and substituting into
(5) yields
W (m, c, d) = φ [m+ τ 2M−1 − (1 + i) c+ (1 + id) d]
+max
x,m+1
[U (x)− x− φm+1 + βV+1 (m+1)] .
The first-order conditions are U 0 (x) = 1 and
φ = βV 0+1 (m+1) (6)
where V 0+1 (m+1) is the marginal value of an additional unit of money taken
into period t+ 1. Notice that the optimal choice of x is the same across time
for all agents and the m+1 is independent of m. As a result, the distribution
of money holdings is degenerate at the beginning of the following period. The
envelope conditions are
Wm=φ (7)
Wc=−φ (1 + i) (8)
Wd=φ (1 + id) . (9)
13This eliminates stationary equilibria where γ is stochastic.
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3.2 The first market
Let qb and qs, respectively, denote the quantities consumed by a buyer and
produced by a seller trading in market 1. Let p be the nominal price of goods
in market 1. While we use competitive pricing for most of what we do, we
also consider matching and bargaining later on to compare the allocation with
financial intermediation to the allocation in Lagos and Wright [21].
It is straightforward to show that agents who are buyers will never deposit
funds in the bank and sellers will never take out loans. Thus, cs = db = 0.
In what follows we let c denote loans taken out by buyers and d deposits
of sellers. We also drop these arguments in W (m, c, d) where relevant for
notational simplicity.
An agent who hasm money at the opening of the first market has expected
lifetime utility
V (m) = (1− n) [u (qb) +W (m+ τ bM−1 + c− pqb, c)]
+n [−c (qs) +W (m+ τ sM−1 − d+ pqs, d)]
(10)
where pqb is the amount of money spent as a buyer and pqs the money received
as a seller. Once the preference shock occurs, agents become either a buyer
or a seller. Note that sellers cannot deposit receipts of cash, pqs, earned from
selling in market 1. In short, the bank closes before the onset of trading in
market 1.
Sellers’ decisions. If an agent is a seller in the first market, his problem is
max
qs,d
[−c (qs) +W (m+ τ sM−1 − d+ pqs, d)]
s.t. d ≤ m+ τ sM−1.
The first-order conditions are
−c0 (qs) + pWm=0
−Wm +Wd − λd=0.
where λd is the Lagrangian multiplier on the deposit constraint. Using (7),
the first condition reduces to
c0 (qs) = pφ. (11)
Sellers produce such that the ratio of marginal costs across markets (c0 (qs) /1)
is equal to the relative price (pφ) of goods across markets. Due to the linearity
11
of the envelope conditions, qs is independent of m and d. Consequently, sellers
produce the same amount no matter how much money they hold or what
financial decisions they make. Finally, it is straightforward to show that for
any id > 0 the deposit constraint is binding and so sellers deposit all their
money balances.
Buyers’ decisions. If an agent is a buyer in the first market, his problem
is
max
qb,c
[u (qb) +W (m+ τ bM−1 + c− pqb, c)]
s.t. pqb ≤ m+ τ bM−1 + c
c ≤ c¯.
Notice that buyers cannot spend more cash than they bring into the first
market, m, plus their borrowing, c, and the transfer τ bM−1. They also face the
constraint that the loan size is bounded above by c¯. They take this constraint
as given. However, in equilibrium it is determined endogenously.
Using (7), (8) and (11) the buyer’s first-order conditions reduce to
u0 (qb)= c0 (qs) (1 + λ/φ) (12)
φi=λ− λc (13)
where λ is the multiplier on the buyer’s cash constraint and λc on the borrowing
constraint. If λ = 0, then (12) reduces to u0 (qb) = c0 (qs) implying trades are
efficient.
For λ > 0, these first-order conditions yield
u0 (qb)
c0 (qs)
= 1 + i+ λc/φ.
If λc = 0, then
u0 (qb)
c0 (qs)
= 1 + i. (14)
In this case the buyer borrows up to the point where the marginal benefit of
borrowing equals the marginal cost. He spends all his money and consumes
qb = (m+ τ bM−1 + c) /p. Note that for i > 0 trades are inefficient. In effect,
a positive nominal interest rate acts as tax on consumption.
Finally, if λc > 0
u0 (qb)
c0 (qs)
> 1 + i. (15)
12
In this case the marginal value of an extra unit of a loan exceeds the mar-
ginal cost. Hence, a borrower would be willing to pay more than the pre-
vailing loan rate. However, if banks are worried about default, then the
interest rate may not rise to clear the market and credit rationing occurs.
Consequently, the buyer borrows c¯, spends all of his money and consumes
qb =
¡
m+ τ bM−1 + c¯
¢
/p.
Since all buyers enter the period with the same amount of money and face
the same problem, qb is the same for all of them. The same is true for the
sellers. Finally, market clearing implies
qs =
1− n
n
qb. (16)
Banks. Banks accept nominal deposits, paying the nominal interest rate id,
and make nominal loans c at nominal rate i. The banking sector is perfectly
competitive with free entry, so banks take these rates as given. There is no
strategic interaction among banks or between banks and agents. In particular,
there is no bargaining over terms of the loan contract. Finally, we assume that
there are no operating costs or reserve requirements.
The representative bank solves the following problem per borrower
max
c
(i− id) c
s.t. c ≤ c¯
u (qb)− (1 + i) cφ ≥ Γ
where Γ is the reservation value of the borrower. The reservation value is the
borrower’s surplus from receiving a loan at another bank. We investigate two
assumptions about repayment. In the first case, banks can force repayment
at no cost so the borrowing constraint is c¯ = ∞. In the second case, we
assume that a borrower who fails to repay his loan will be shut out of the
banking sector in all future periods. Given this punishment, we need to derive
conditions to ensure voluntary repayment which determines c¯.
The first-order condition is
i− id − λL + λΓ
∙
u0 (qb)
dqb
dc
− (1 + i)φ
¸
= 0
where λL and λΓ are the Lagrange multipliers on the lending constraint and
participation constraint of the borrower respectively. For i− id > 0 the bank
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would like to make the largest loan possible to the borrower. Thus, the bank
will always choose a loan size such that λΓ > 0.
With free entry banks make zero profits so i = id. Since, dqb/dc = φ/c0 (qs)
we have
u0 (qb)
c0 (qs)
= 1 + i+
λL
λΓφ
.
If λL = 0 the loan offered by the bank implies (14) so repayment is not an
issue. If λL > 0 the constraint on the loan size is binding and implies (15).
In a symmetric equilibrium all buyers borrow the same amount, c, and sellers
deposit the same amount, d, so loan market clearing requires
(1− n) c = nd. (17)
Marginal value of money. Using (10) the marginal value of money is
V 0 (m) = (1− n)u
0 (qb)
p
+ nφ (1 + id) .
In the appendix we show that the value function is concave inm so the solution
to (6) is well defined.
Using (11) V 0 (m) reduces to
V 0 (m) = φ
∙
(1− n) u
0 (qb)
c0 (qs)
+ n (1 + id)
¸
. (18)
The marginal value of money has two components. If the agent is a buyer he
receives u0 (qb) /c0 (qs) from spending the marginal unit of money. This effect
is standard. Now, if he is a seller he can lend the unit of money and receive
1 + id. Thus, financial intermediation increases the marginal value of money
because sellers can deposit idle cash and earn interest.
4 Equilibrium with enforcement
In this section, as a benchmark, we assume that the monetary authority can
impose lump-sum taxes and banks can force repayment of loans at no cost.
This does not imply that the banks or the monetary authority can dictate the
terms of trade between private agents in the goods market.
In any stationary monetary equilibrium use (6) lagged one period to elim-
inate V 0 (m) from (18). Then use (4) and (16) to get
γ − β
β
= (1− n)
"
u0 (qb)
c0
¡
1−n
n qb
¢ − 1#+ nid. (19)
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The right-hand side measures the value of bringing one extra unit of money
into the first market. The first term reflects the net benefit (marginal utility
minus marginal cost) of spending the unit of money on goods when a buyer
and the second term is the value of depositing an extra unit of idle balances
when a seller.
Since banks can force agents to repay their loans, agents are unconstrained
so c¯ =∞. This implies that (14) holds. Using it in (19) yields14
γ − β
β
= (1− n) i+ nid. (20)
Now, the first term on the right-hand side reflects the interest saving from
borrowing one less unit of money when a buyer.
Zero profit implies i = id and so
γ − β
β
= i. (21)
We can rewrite this in terms of qb using (14) to get
γ − β
β
=
u0 (qb)
c0
¡
1−n
n qb
¢ − 1. (22)
Definition 1 When repayment of loans can be enforced, a monetary equilib-
rium with credit is an interest rate i satisfying (21) and a quantity qb satisfying
(22).
Proposition 1 Assume repayment of loans can be enforced. Then if γ > β,
a unique monetary equilibrium with credit exists. Equilibrium consumption is
decreasing in γ, and satisfies qb < q∗ with qb → q∗ as γ → β.
It is clear from (22) that money is neutral, but not super-neutral. In-
creasing its stock has no effect on qb, while changing the growth rate γ does.
Moreover, the Friedman rule (γ = β) generates the first-best allocation.
How does this allocation differ from the allocation in an economy without
credit? Let q˜b denote the quantity consumed when there is no financial in-
termediation. It is straightforward to show that q˜b solves (19) with id = 0,
i.e.,
γ − β
β
= (1− n)
"
u0 (q˜b)
c0
¡
1−n
n q˜b
¢ − 1# . (23)
14This equation implies that if nominal bonds could be traded in market 2, their nominal
rate of return, ib, would be (1− n) i+nid. Thus agents would be indifferent between holding
a nominal bond or holding a bank deposit.
15
Comparing (23) to (22), it is clear that q˜b < qb for any γ > β. Thus, we have
proved the following
Corollary 1 For γ > β financial intermediation improves the allocation and
welfare.
The key result of this section is that financial intermediation improves the
allocation away from the Friedman rule. The greatest impact on welfare is for
moderate values of inflation. The reason is that near the Friedman rule there is
little gain from redistributing idle cash balances while for high inflation rates
money is of little value anyway. At the Friedman rule agents can perfectly
self-insure against consumption risk because the cost of holding money is zero.
Consequently, there is no welfare gain from financial intermediation.15
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
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Figure 2: Difference in welfare.
The welfare implications of financial intermediation are displayed in Figure
2. The graph shows the difference (DW =W b−W nb) in the expected lifetime
utilities with financial intermediation (W b) and without (W nb) as a function of
the inflation rate γ. Note that the difference is equal to zero when γ = β (at the
origin), converges to zero when γ →∞ and is maximal for some intermediate
rate of inflation. Figure 2 is drawn with the utility function u (q) = q0.8/0.8,
cost function c (q) = q, discount factor β = 0.95 and measure of sellers n = 0.4.
15With extensive margin externalities as in [4] or [30], being away from the Friedman
rule can be optimal. In this case, financial intermediation clearly is welfare improving.
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Given that financial intermediation improves the allocation away from the
Friedman rule, is it because it relaxes borrowers’ liquidity constraints or be-
cause it allows payment of interest to depositors? The following proposition
answers this question.
Proposition 2 The gain in welfare from financial intermediation is due to
the fact that it allows payment of interest to depositors and not from relaxing
borrowers’ liquidity constraints.
According to Proposition 2 the gain in welfare comes from payment of in-
terest to agents holding idle balances. To prove this claim we show in the proof
of Proposition 2 that in equilibrium, agents are indifferent between borrowing
to finance equilibrium consumption or bringing in a sufficient amount of cash
to finance the same consumption. The only importance of borrowing is to sus-
tain payment of interest to depositors. That is, even though each individual
agent is indifferent between borrowing and not borrowing, agents taking out
loans are needed to finance the interest received by the depositors.
As a final proof of this argument, we consider a systematic government pol-
icy that redistributes cash in market 1 by imposing lump-sum taxes on sellers
and giving the cash as lump-sum transfers to buyers. This clearly relaxes the
liquidity constraints of the buyers while paying no interest to depositors. How-
ever, inspection of (23) reveals that neither τ 1 nor τ b appear in this equation.
Hence, varying the transfer across the two markets or by redistributing cash
from sellers to buyers in a predictable, lump-sum fashion has no effect on q˜b. It
only affects the equilibrium price of money in the last market. Agents simply
change the amount of money they bring into market 1 and so the demand for
money changes in market 2, which alters the price of money φ. Note also that
this implies that the allocation with credit cannot be replicated by government
policies using lump-sum transfers or taxes.
Finally, we would like to see how the equilibrium allocation in our credit
model compares with Lagos and Wright [21]. Towards this end, we now con-
sider matching and bargaining in market 1 as an alternative to Walrasian
pricing.
Bargaining For simplicity we assume n = 1/2 and τ b = τ s = τ . The timing
is similar as before in that agents observe their preference shocks, then go to
the bank to borrow and deposit funds. The bank then closes. The difference is
that buyers now are paired with sellers and they bargain according to the gen-
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eralized Nash protocol over the quantity of goods and money to be exchanged.
The decisions in market 2 are unaffected.
The value function for each agent at the opening of market 1 is
V (m) = 1
2
[u (qb) +W (m+ τM−1 + c− zb, c)]
+1
2
[−c (qs) +W (m+ τM−1 − d+ zs, d)]
where zb is the amount of money given up when a buyer and zs is the amount
received when a seller.
Due to the linearity of W (m, c, d), the bargaining problem is
max
q,z
[u (q)− φz]θ [−c (q) + φz]1−θ
s.t. z ≤ m+ τM−1 + c
where θ is the buyer’s bargaining weight. As in Lagos and Wright [21], the
solution to the bargaining problem yields
φz = g (q) ≡ θc(q)u
0(q) + (1− θ)u(q)c0(q)
θu0(q) + (1− θ)c0(q)
where g0 (q) > 0. If θ < 1, then g0 (q) > c0 (q) while for θ = 1, g0 (q) = c0 (q) .
In any monetary equilibrium, the buyer will spend all of his cash holdings so
z = m+ τM−1+ c. It then follows that dz/dm = 1 and ∂q/∂m = φ/g0 (q) > 0.
To determine borrowing and lending choices, we still have that sellers will
deposit all of their money in the bank. Those who are buyers now maximize
max
c
u (q) +W (m+ τM−1 + c− z, c)
s.t. z ≤ m+ τM−1 + c.
It is straightforward to show that the solution yields
u0 (q)
g0 (q)
= 1 + i. (24)
Differentiating V (m) and rearranging gives
V 0 (m) =
φ
2
∙
u0 (q)
g0 (q)
+ 1 + id
¸
.
Using (6) lagged one period, (24) and i = id yields
γ − β
β
=
u0 (q)
g0 (q)
− 1 = i. (25)
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The interesting aspect of this result is that the nominal interest rate with
bargaining is exactly the same as it is with competitive pricing. It then follows
from (24) that the quantity traded in all matches under bargaining is lower
than under competitive pricing since g0 (q) > c0 (q). This is due to the holdup
problem that occurs on money demand under bargaining.
How does the allocation here compare to the allocation in Lagos andWright
[21]? Their equilibrium value of q solves16
γ − β
β
=
1
2
∙
u0 (q)
g0 (q)
− 1
¸
. (26)
It is clear that the quantity solving (25) is greater than the quantity solving
(26). Thus the existence of a credit market increases output and welfare even
with bargaining.17
5 Equilibrium without enforcement
In the previous section enforcement occurred in two occasions. First, the
monetary authority could impose lump-sum taxes. Second, banks could force
repayment of loans. Here, we assume away any enforcement. The first impli-
cation is that the monetary authority cannot run a deflation. Consequently,
γ ≥ 1. The second is that those who borrow in market 1 have an incentive to
default in market 2. To offset this short-run benefit we assume that if an agent
defaults on his loan then the only punishment is permanent exclusion from the
banking system. This is consistent with the requirement that all trades are
voluntary since banks can refuse to trade with private agents. Furthermore,
it is in the banks’ best interest to share information about agents’ repayment
histories.
For credit to exist, it must be the case that borrowers prefer repaying loans
to being banished from the banking system. Given this punishment, the real
borrowing constraint φc¯ is endogenous and we need to derive conditions to
ensure voluntary repayment. In what follows, since the transfers only affect
prices, we set τ b = τ s = τ 1 > 0.
For buyers entering the second market with no money and who repay their
loans, the expected discounted utility in a stationary equilibrium is
W (m) = U (x∗)− hb + βV+1 (m+1)
16This is the expression if one sets σ = 1/2 in their model.
17A similar result is found in [14] using a model of competitive search where market
makers can charge differential entry fees for buyers and sellers.
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where hb is a buyer’s production in the second market if he repays his loan.
Consider the case of a buyer who defaults on his loan. The benefit of
defaulting is that he has more leisure in the second market because he does
not work to repay the loan. The cost is that he is out of the banking system,
meaning that he cannot borrow or deposit funds for the rest of his life. He
cannot lend because the bank would confiscate his deposits to settle his loan
arrears. Thus, a deviating buyer’s expected discounted utility is
cW (m) = U (bx)− bhb + βbV+1 (mˆ+1)
where the hat indicates the optimal choice by a deviator. The value of being
in the banking system W (m) as well as the expected discounted utility of
defection cW (m) depend on the growth rate of the money supply γ. This puts
constraints on γ that the monetary authority can impose without destroying
financial intermediation.
Existence of a monetary equilibrium with credit requires that W (m) ≥cW (m), where the real borrowing constraint φc¯ satisfies
W (m) = cW (m) . (27)
Given a borrowing constraint there are two possibilities: 1) the borrowing
constraint is nonbinding for all agents or 2) it binds for some agents. In an
unconstrained equilibrium with credit we have φc < φc¯ and in a constrained
equilibrium φc = φc¯. The following Lemma is used for the remainder of this
section.
Lemma 3 The real borrowing constraint φc¯ satisfies
φc¯ =
β
(1 + i) (1− β)
½
(1− n)Ψ (qb, bqb) + c0 (qs)µγ − ββ
¶
[bqb − (1− n) qb]¾
(28)
where
Ψ (qb, bqb) = u (qb)− u (bqb)− c0 (qs) (qb − bqb) ≥ 0.
In any equilibrium, banks lend out all of their deposits so real lending
satisfies
φc =
n
1− nφM.
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To guarantee repayment in a constrained equilibrium banks charge a nominal
loan rate, ı¯, that is below the market clearing rate.18
Definition 2 A monetary equilibrium with unconstrained credit is a triple
(qb, bqb, i) satisfying
γ − β
β
=(1− n)
∙
u0 (qb)
c0 (qs)
− 1
¸
+ ni (29)
γ − β
β
=(1− n)
∙
u0 (bqb)
c0 (qs)
− 1
¸
(30)
u0 (qb)
c0 (qs)
=1 + i (31)
such that 0 < φc = nc0 (qs) qb < φc¯, where qs = 1−nn qb.
Definition 3 Amonetary equilibrium with constrained credit is a triple (q¯b, bqb, ı¯)
satisfying (28),(29) and (30) where nc0 (q¯s) q¯b = φc¯ and q¯s = 1−nn q¯b.
Proposition 4 There exists a critical value β˜ such that if β ≥ β˜ there is a
ıˆ > 0 such that the following is true:
(i) If i > ıˆ, a unique monetary equilibrium with unconstrained credit exists.
(ii) If 0 < i ≤ ıˆ, a monetary equilibrium with constrained credit may exist.
(iii) If i = 0, no monetary equilibrium with credit exists.
According to Proposition 4, existence of a monetary equilibrium with credit
requires that there is some inflation. The reason for this is quite intuitive. If a
borrower works to repay his loan in market 2, he is strictly worse off than when
he defaults since the outside option (trading with money only) yields almost
the efficient consumption q∗ in all future periods. With zero inflation, agents
are able to self insure at low cost, thus having access to financial markets is
of little value. As a consequence, borrowers will not repay their loans and so
financial intermediation is impossible. This result is related to Aiyagari and
18This may seem counter-intuitive since one would think that banks would reduce l¯ to
induce repayment. However, this cannot be an equilibrium since it would imply that banks
are not lending out all of their deposits. If banks are not lending out all of their deposits
then zero profits would require id = (1− µ) i where µ is the fraction of deposits held idle by
the bank. If all banks were to choose a triple (i, id, µ) with µ > 0 such that they earned zero
profits, then a bank could capture the entire market and become a monopolist by raising id
by an infinitesimal amount and lowering µ and i by an infinitesimal amount. Since all banks
can do this, in a constrained equilibrium, the only feasible solution is µ = 0 and i = id = ı¯.
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Williamson [1] who also report a break-down of financial intermediation close
to the Friedman rule in a dynamic contracting model with private information.
For low rates of inflation credit rationing occurs. Again, in this case the cost
of using money to self insure is low. To induce repayment banks charge a below
market-clearing interest rate since this reduces the amount borrowers have to
repay. In short, with an endogenous borrowing constraint, the interest rate is
lower than would occur in an economy where banks can force repayment.19
One aspect that is puzzling about this result is that the incentive to de-
fault is higher for low nominal interest rates and lower for high nominal in-
terest rates. This seems counter-intuitive at first glance since standard credit-
rationing models, such as [31], suggest that the likelihood of default increases
as interest rates rise. The reason for the difference is that standard credit ra-
tioning models focus on real interest rates, while our model is concerned with
nominal interest rates. In our model, nominal rates rise because of perfectly
anticipated inflation, which acts as a tax on a deviator’s wealth since he carries
more money for transactions purposes. This reduces the incentive to default
thereby alleviating the need to ration credit. Consequently, a key contribu-
tion of our analysis is to show how credit rationing can arise from changes in
nominal interest rates.
Is Inflation Welfare Improving? In an unconstrained borrowing equilib-
rium, it is straightforward to show that inflation is always welfare reducing
since it reduces the real value of money balances and consumption for all
agents. However, in a constrained borrowing equilibrium, it may be optimal
for the monetary authority to set γ > 1 since inflation increases the cost of
being excluded from the banking system. This relaxes the borrowing con-
straint and creates a first-order welfare gain. We would like to know under
what conditions the optimal inflation rate is positive. We can thus state the
following
Proposition 5 In a constrained credit equilibrium, if β > (1 + n)−1, then a
positive steady state inflation rate maximizes welfare.
Thus, as long as agents are sufficiently patient, inflation is welfare improv-
ing. By relaxing the budget constraint, inflation allows the nominal interest
rate to increase towards the market clearing level. This increases the compen-
sation sellers receive for bringing in idle money balances yet it does not crowd
19Similar results occur in [18], [17] or [2].
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out consumption by buyers since they are credit constrained. Consequently,
the demand for money in market 2 increases, which raises the real value of
money and qb. To illustrate this proposition we solve the model numerically
and the results are contained in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Welfare with endogenous borrowing constraint.
Figure 3 is a numerical example of our economy in which the equilibrium
with credit exists and is unique. The solid line is the equilibrium with credit
while the dashed line is the equilibrium without credit. At the origin, γ =
1, the constrained credit equilibrium breaks down so the allocation is the
same as the equilibrium without credit. When γ < eγ, where eγ = β (1 + ıˆ),
the borrowing constraint is binding and welfare is increasing in γ and when
γ > eγ the borrowing constraint is not binding and welfare is decreasing in γ.
Note that the equilibrium with credit has higher welfare than the equilibrium
without credit even if there is rationing.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how money and credit can coexist in a model
where money is essential. Our main findings are that reallocating idle cash via
financial intermediation can expand output and improve welfare away from the
Friedman rule but not at the Friedman rule. Furthermore, such an improve-
ment cannot be achieved through a government policy of lump-sum taxes and
transfers. Interestingly, financial intermediation is most valuable for moderate
23
rates of inflation. Also, when voluntary repayment is an issue, credit rationing
may arise and in this situation, inflation improves welfare.
Our framework is open to many extensions such as private bank note is-
sue, financing of investment instead of consumption, and longer term financial
contracts. We could also extend the model to investigate the role of banks
in transmitting aggregate shocks and study the optimal response of a central
bank to these shocks as in [7]. Finally, the interaction of government regulation
and stabilization policies would allow analysis of different monetary arrange-
ments such as those expressed by the real-bills doctrine or the quantity theory
as studied in [28].
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Appendix
Proof that V (m) is concave ∀m. Differentiating (10) with respect to m
V 0 (m) = (1− n)
£
u0 (qb)
∂qb
∂m +Wm
¡
1− p∂qb∂m +
∂c
∂m
¢
+Wc ∂c∂m
¤
+n
£
−c0 (qs) ∂qs∂m +Wm
¡
1 + p∂qs∂m −
∂d
∂m
¢
+Wd ∂d∂m
¤
Recall from (7), (8), and (9) that Wm = φ, Wc = −φ (1 + i) and Wd =
φ (1 + id) ∀m. Furthermore, ∂qs/∂m = 0 because the quantity a seller pro-
duces is independent of his money holdings. We also know that ∂d/∂m = 1
since a seller deposits all his cash when i > 0. Hence,
V 0 (m) = (1− n)
£
u0 (qb)
∂qb
∂m + φ
¡
1− p∂qb∂m +
∂c
∂m
¢
− φ (1 + i) ∂c∂m
¤
+nφ (1 + id)
Since i > 0 implies pqb = m+ τ bM−1+ c we have 1−p (∂qb/∂m)+∂c/∂m = 0.
Hence20
V 0 (m) = (1− n)u0 (qb) /p+ nφ (1 + id)
In a symmetric equilibrium qs = 1−nn qb. Define m
∗ = pq∗. Then if m < m∗,
0 < qb < q∗, implying ∂qb/∂m > 0 so that V 00 (m) < 0. If m ≥ m∗, qb = q∗
implying ∂qb/∂m = 0, so that V 00 (m) = 0. Thus, V (m) is concave ∀m.
Proof of Proposition 1. Because u(q) is strictly concave there is a unique
value q that solves (14), and for γ > β, q < q∗ where q∗ is the efficient quantity
solving u0(q∗) = c0
¡
1−n
n q
∗¢. As γ → β, u0 (q) → c0 ¡1−nn q¢, q → q∗, and from
(21) i → 0. In this equilibrium, the Friedman rule sustains efficient trades
in the first market. Since V (m) is concave, then for γ > β, the choice m is
maximal.
We now derive equilibrium consumption and production in the second mar-
ket. Recall that, due to idiosyncratic trade shocks and financial transactions,
money holdings are heterogeneous after the first market closes. Therefore, if
we set m = M−1, the money holdings of agents at the opening of the second
market are 0 for buyers and 1n (1 + τ 1)M−1 for sellers.
Equation (6) gives us x∗ = U 0−1 (1). The buyer’s production in the second
market can be derived as follows
hb = x∗ + φ {m+1 + (1 + i) c− τ 2M−1} = x∗ + c0 (qs) qb + inc0 (qs) qb
20Note that u0 (qb) ∂qb∂m − φ (1 + i)
∂l
∂m = u
0 (qb) ∂qb∂m − φ (1 + i)
h
p∂qb∂m − 1
i
= ∂qb∂m (u
0 (qb)− φ (1 + i) p) + φ (1 + i) = φ (1 + i) = u
0(qb)
p .
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since in equilibrium
m+1=M =M−1 + τ1M−1 + τ 2M−1
c0 (qs) qb=φ [(1 + τ 1)M−1 + c]
φc=nc0 (qs) qb.
Thus, an agent who was a buyer in market 1 has to work to recover the
production cost of his consumption and the interest on his loan. The seller’s
production is
hs=x∗ + φ {m+1 − [pqs + (1 + τ 1)M−1 + idd+ τ 2M−1]}
=x∗ − c0 (qs) qs − φidd
The expected hours worked h satisfies
h = (1− n)hb + nhs = x∗ (32)
since in equilibrium qb = n1−nqs and i (1− n) c = idnd. Finally, hours in market
2 can be also expressed in terms of q as in the following table
Trading history: Production in the last market:
Buy hb = x∗ + c0 (qs) (1− n) qb + ne (qb)u (qb)
Sell hs = x∗ − (1−n)n [c0 (qs) (1− n) qb + ne (qb)u (qb)]
Since we assumed that the elasticity of utility e (qb) is bounded, we can
scale U(x) such that there is a value x∗ = U 0−1 (1) greater than the last term
for all qb ∈ [0, q∗]. Hence, hs is positive for for all qb ∈ [0, q∗] ensuring that the
equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that at some point in time t an agent
at the beginning of market 2 chooses never to borrow again but continues to
deposit. The first thing to note is that it is optimal for him to buy the same
quantity qb since his optimal choice still satisfies (22). This implies that his
money balances are m¯+1 = m+1+ c+1. An agent who decides to never borrow
has to carry more money but he saves the interest on loans in the future. In
particular, consumption and production in the market 1 are not affected. The
difference in lifetime payoffs come from difference in hours worked.
If he enters market 2 having been a buyer, the hours worked are
h¯b=x∗ + φ {m+1 + c+1 + (1 + i) c− τ 2M−1}
=x∗ + c0 (qs) qb + φc+1 + φic
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while if he sold in market 1 he works
h¯s=x∗ + φ {m+1 + c+1 − [pqs + (1 + i) d+ τ 2M−1]}
=x∗ − c0 (qs) qs + φc+1 − φidd
The expected hours worked satisfy
h¯ = (1− n) h¯b + nh¯s = x∗ + φc+1
Consequently, from (32) the additional hours worked are
h¯− h = φc+1 = γnc0 (qs) qb > 0 (33)
since c+1 = γc in a steady state.
Let us next consider the hours worked in market 2 in some future period.
Since he has no loan to repay the hours worked are
h˘b=x∗ + φ {m+1 + c+1 − τ 2M−1}
=x∗ + c0 (qs) qb + nc0 (qs) qb (γ − 1)
if he was a buyer while if he sold in market 1 he works
h˘s=x∗ + φ
©
m+1 + c+1 −
£
pqs + (1 + i) d¯+ τ 2M−1
¤ª
=x∗ + nc0 (qs) qb (γ − 1)− c0 (qs) qs − (γ − β) c0 (qs) qb/β
The expected hours worked h satisfies
h˘ = (1− n) h˘b + nh˘s = x∗ − nc0 (qs) qbγ (1− β) /β
The expected gain from this strategy in any future period is
h˘− h = −nc0 (qs) qbγ (1− β) /β < 0 (34)
Then, from (33) and (34), the total expected gain from this deviation is
h¯− h+
β
³
h˘− h
´
1− β = 0.
So agents are indifferent to borrowing at the current rate of interest or taking
in the equivalent amount of money themselves.
Proof of Corollary 1.
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Neither τ 1 nor τ b appear in (22). Therefore, (τ 1, τ 2) can only affect the
equilibrium φ. Of course, by changing τ 1 we change τ 2, for a given rate of
growth of money. To see how the transfers affect φ note that φc = c0(qs)nqb.
Since c = n
1−nM−1(1 + τ s) =
n
1−nM(
1+τs
1+τ ) and qs =
1−n
n qb then we have
φ =
c0(qs)nqb
c
=
(1− n)c0(1−nn qb) (1 + τ)
M(1 + τ s)
which implies the price of money in the second market, φ, is affected by the
timing and size of lump-sum transfers.
Proof of Lemma 3. Since the transfers do not affect quantities set τ b = τ s =
τ 1 = 0 and τ 2 = τ . We now derive the endogenous real borrowing constraint
φc¯. This quantity is the maximal real loan that a borrower is willing to repay
in the second market at given market prices. For buyers entering the second
market with no money, who repay their loans, the expected discounted utility
in a steady state is
W (m) = U (x∗)− hb + βV+1 (m+1)
where hb is a buyer’s production in the second market if he repays his loan.
Consider a borrower who borrowed c¯. in market 1 and is considering defaulting
on his loans in market 2. A deviating buyer’s expected discounted utility is
cW (m) = U (bx)− bhb + βbV+1 (bm+1)
where the hat indicates the optimal choice by a deviator. Thus φc¯ is the value
of borrowing such that W (m) =cW (m) or
U (x∗)− U (bx) + bhb − hb + β hV+1 (m+1)− bV+1 (bm+1)i = 0. (35)
The continuation payoffs are
bV+1 (bm+1)= (1− β)−1 h(1− n)u (bqb)− nc (bqs) + U (x∗)− bhi
V+1 (m+1)= (1− β)−1 [(1− n)u (qb)− nc (qs) + U (xˆ)− h] . (36)
We now derive bx, bqb, bqs and bhb. In the last market the deviating buyer’s
program is
cW (bm)= max
ex,ehb,mˆ+1
h
U (bx)− bhb + βbV+1 (bm+1)i
s.t. bx+ φbm+1 = bhb + φ (bm+ τ 2M−1) .
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The first-order conditions are U 0 (bx) = 1 and −φ + βbV 0+1 (mˆ+1) = 0. Thus,bx = x∗. In market one, it is straightforward to show that if the deviator is
a seller in the first market he sells −c0 (bqs) + pφ = 0. Hence, the deviator
produces the same amount as non-deviating sellers so bqs = qs = 1−nn qb.
Finally, the marginal value of the money satisfies
bV 0+1 (mˆ) = φ ∙(1− n) u0 (bqb)c0 (qs) + n
¸
which means that the deviator’s choice of money balances satisfies
γ − β
β
= (1− n)
∙
u0 (bqb)
c0 (qs)
− 1
¸
. (37)
Now if we compare (37) with (22) we find that for γ > β
1− n = u
0 (qb)− c0 (qs)
u0 (bqb)− c0 (qs) (38)
implying bqb < qb. Thus, using (35) and (36) we obtain
hb − bhb = β
1− β
h
(1− n) [u (qb)− u (bqb)] + bh− hi . (39)
Deriving bhb − hb. If the buyer repays his loans he works
hb=x∗ + φm+1 − φ
£
m− c¯− pqb
¤
− φτM−1 + φ (1 + i) c¯
=x∗ + ic¯+ φpqb
where we use the equilibrium conditionm+1 = m+τM−1 = γm. If he defaults
on his loans, he works
bhb=x∗ + φbm+1 − φ ¡m− c¯− pqb¢− φτM−1
=x∗ + φ (bm+1 −m+1)− φc¯+ φpqb
=x∗ + φγ (bm−m)− φc¯+ φpqb
where we use the equilibrium condition that a defaulter’s money balances must
grow at the rate γ so bm+1 = bm+ τM−1 = γ bm. Note that how much he spent
in the previous market 1 is the same whether he repays or not. Thus
hb − bhb=x∗ + φic¯+ φpqb − x∗ − φ (bm+1 −m+1) + φc¯− φpqε
=φ (1 + i) c¯− φγ (bm−m) . (40)
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Deriving bh− h: Once the agent defaults, as a buyer he spends pbqb units
of money so his hours worked are
bh=x∗ + φbm+1 − φ (bm− pbqb)− φτM−1
=x∗ + φ (bm+1 − bm) + φpbqb − φ (m+1 −m)
=x∗ + (γ − 1)φ (bm−m) + φpbqb.
For a seller we have
bhs=x∗ + φbm+1 − φ (bm+ pbqs)− φτM−1
=x∗ + (γ − 1)φ (bm−m)− φpµ1− n
n
¶
qb.
So for a defaulter expected hours worked are bh = (1− n)bhb + nbhs = x∗ +
(γ − 1)φ (bm−m) while if he does not deviate he works h = x∗ and so
bh− h = (γ − 1)φ (bm−m) . (41)
Substituting (40) and (41) into (39) and rearranging yields
φc¯ =
β
(1 + i) (1− β)
½
(1− n)Ψ (qb, bqb) + c0 (qs) γ − ββ [bqb − (1− n) qb]
¾
(42)
where Ψ (qb, bqb) = u (qb)− u (bqb)− c0 ¡1−nn qb¢ (qb − bqb) > 0 since
u (qb)− u (bqb)
qb − bqb > u0 (qb) > c0 (qs) (43)
for all γ > β. The RHS of (42) must be positive to have a credit equilibrium.
For this to be positive, substitute (37) and (43) into (42) and rearrange to
obtain
u (qb)− u (bqb)
qb − bqb > u0 (qb) qb − bqb
u0(qb)
u0(eqb)
qb − bqb .
The RHS of this inequality is less than u0 (qb) since u0 (qb) < u0 (bqb) while from
(43) the LHS is greater than u0 (qb) . Thus φc¯ > 0 for γ > β.
Proof of Proposition 4. Unconstrained credit equilibrium. We need
c0 (qs)nqb = φc < φc¯. Since i = (γ − β) /β in an unconstrained equilibrium
from (42) we have
(1− β) (1 + i) c0 (qs)nqb < β (1− n)Ψ (qb, bqb)+βic0 (qs) [bqb − (1− n) qb] . (44)
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Define
g (i, β)= (1− β) (1 + i) c0 (qs)nqb
f (i, β)=β (1− n)Ψ (qb, bqb) + βic0 (qs) [bqb − (1− n) qb] .
Note that g (0, β) > 0 and f(0, β) = 0 for all 0 < β < 1 since Ψ (qb, bqb)|(0,β) = 0.
So (44) is violated at i = 0 and β < 1. Define ∆ (i, β) ≡ g (i, β)− f (i, β) and
consider solutions to ∆ (i, β) = 0. Note that ∆(0, 1) = 0 since qb|(0,1) =bqb|(0,1) = q∗. Let ∆i (i, β) ≡ ∂∆ (i, β) /∂i and ∆β (i, β) ≡ ∂∆ (i, β) /∂β. We
have
∂g (i, β)
∂i
= (1− β)nqbc0 (qs) + (1− β)
∙
c0 (qs)
∂qb
∂i
+ qbc00 (qs)
∂qs
∂i
¸
(1 + i)n
and
∂f (i, β)
∂i
=β
½
(1− n) ∂Ψ (qb, bqb)
∂i
+ c0 (qs) [bqb − (1− n) qb]
+ic00 (qs)
∂qs
∂i
[bqb − (1− n) qb] + ic0 (qs) ∙∂bqb∂i − (1− n) ∂qb∂i
¸¾
.
These partial derivatives are continuous with
∂g (i, β)
∂i
¯¯¯¯
(0,1)
= 0 and
∂f (i, β)
∂i
¯¯¯¯
(0,1)
= c0
µ
1− n
n
q∗
¶
nq∗ > 0.
Therefore ∆i (i, β) is continuous and non-zero with
∆i (0, 1) = −c0
µ
1− n
n
q∗
¶
nq∗ < 0.
We also see that
∂g (i, β)
∂β
= −nqbc0 (qs) (1 + i) + (1− β)
∙
c0 (qs)
∂qb
∂β
+ qbc00 (qs)
∂qs
∂β
¸
(1 + i)n
∂f (i, β)
∂β
=
f (i, β)
β
+ β
½
(1− n) ∂Ψ (qb, bqb)
∂β
+ic00 (qs)
∂qs
∂β
[bqb − (1− n) qb] + ic0 (qs) ∙∂bqb∂β − (1− n) ∂qb∂β
¸¾
with
∂g (i, β)
∂β
¯¯¯¯
(0,1)
= −c0
µ
1− n
n
q∗
¶
nq∗ < 0
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∂f (i, β)
∂β
¯¯¯¯
(0,1)
= f (0, 1) + (1− n) ∂Ψ (i, β)
∂β
¯¯¯¯
(0,1)
= 0
since ∂Ψ(qb,eqb)∂β
¯¯¯
(0,1)
= 0 and f (0, 1) = 0. Therefore ∆β (0, 1) is continuous and
∆β (0, 1) = −c0
µ
1− n
n
q∗
¶
nq∗ < 0.
By the implicit function theorem, it follows that, for β arbitrarily close to one,
the expression ∆(i, β) = 0 defines i as an implicit function of β, i.e., i = ıˆ(β).
Furthermore, we have
di
dβ
¯¯¯¯
(0,1)
= −∆β (0, 1)
∆i (0, 1)
= −1,
so that as β falls i grows. It follows from the implicit function theorem that
∆(ˆı, β) = 0 for a unique i = ıˆ > 0 and β sufficiently close to one.
Above we established that g (0, β) > f(0, β) = 0 for all 0 < β < 1. Thus, fix
β˜ < β < 1 where β˜ is close to 1. We have established that g (ˆı, β)−f (ˆı, β) = 0
for some ıˆ > 0. By continuity, we have that if i > ıˆ then g (i, β) < f (i, β)
and so an unconstrained equilibrium exists. For 0 ≤ i < ıˆ, then g (i, β) >
f (i, β) ≥ 0, so if an equilibrium exists it is constrained.
Constrained credit equilibrium We now consider 0 ≤ i < ıˆ. In a con-
strained equilibrium the defection constraint must hold with equality implying
(1 + ı¯)nc0 (q¯s) q¯b =
β
1− β
½
(1− n)Ψ+ c0 (q¯s)
µ
γ − β
β
¶
[bqb − (1− n) q¯b]¾
(45)
where q¯b denotes the quantity consumed and ı¯ is the interest rate in a con-
strained equilibrium. From the first-order conditions on money holdings we
have
γ − β
β
=(1− n)
∙
u0 (q¯b)
c0 (q¯s)
− 1
¸
+ nı¯ (46)
γ − β
β
=(1− n)
∙
u0 (bqb)
c0 (q¯s)
− 1
¸
(47)
where q¯s = 1−nn q¯b. Thus, a constrained equilibrium is a list {q¯b, bqb, ı¯} such that
(45)-(47) hold.
We now investigate the properties of (45)-(47). At ı¯ = 0, from (46) and
(47), q¯b = bqb. Then from (45) we have γ = 1. This implies there is one
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and only one monetary policy consistent with a nominal interest rate of zero
in a constrained credit equilibrium. Taking the total derivative of (45) and
evaluating it at γ = 1, ı¯ = 0, bqb = q¯b using (47) as well to get
dı¯
dγ
|γ=1 = 1
1− β > 0. (48)
These observations imply that for all 1 < γ ≤ γˆ where ıˆ = (γˆ − β) /β we
have ı¯ > 0. It then follows that a constrained credit equilibrium can exist if
and only if 0 ≤ i < ıˆ. However, we cannot show existence of a constrained
equilibrium in general.
Proof of Proposition 5. Differentiate W with respect to γ to get
dW
dγ
¯¯¯¯
γ=1
=
1− n
1− β
∙
u0 (q¯b)− c0
µ
1− n
n
q¯b
¶¸
dq¯b
dγ
¯¯¯¯
γ=1
.
Since u0 (q¯b)−c0 (q¯s) > 0 it is sufficient to show that dq¯bdγ
¯¯¯
γ=1
> 0 for dWdγ
¯¯¯
γ=1
> 0.
Totally differentiate (46), evaluate at γ = 1, ı¯ = 0, bqb = q¯b and use (48) to
obtain
dq¯b
dγ
¯¯¯¯
γ=1
=
∙
1− (1 + n)β
β (1− β) (1− n)
¸"
c0 (q¯s)
2
u00 (q¯b) c0 (q¯s)− u0 (q¯b) c00 (q¯s) 1−nn
#
.
The second bracketed term is negative. Thus if β > 1/ (1 + n) this derivative
is positive and welfare is increasing.
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